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History-dependent evaluations in POMDPs
Xavier Venel ∗, Bruno Ziliotto†
Abstract
We consider POMDPs in which the weight of the stage payoff depends on the past
sequence of signals and actions occurring in the infinitely repeated problem. We prove
that for all ε > 0, there exists a strategy that is ε-optimal for any sequence of weights
satisfying a property that interprets as “the decision-maker is patient enough”. This unifies
and generalizes several results of the literature, and applies notably to POMDPs with limsup
payoffs.
Keywords: Markov decision processes, Partial Observation, Long-run average payoff.
Introduction
A Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) is a discrete-time dynamic decision
model in which at each stage, the decision-maker takes a decision that determines together with
the current state a stage payoff. The state follows a controlled Markov chain. The decision-
maker may not be informed of the current state, but receives a signal at each stage. Thus,
POMDPs generalize the Markov Decision Process (MDP) model, introduced by Bellman [3] and
studied by Blackwell [4], where the decision-maker knows the state. Their study was initiated
independently by various authors [2], [9], [18]. POMDPs are closely related to MDPs with Borel
space. Indeed, a standard way to analyze them is to consider a MDP on an auxiliary state
space, the belief space (see [15], [17], [20]). The fact that this auxiliary state space is infinite
makes the analysis of POMDPs quite delicate. Indeed, even the belief dynamics generated by
a “simple” strategy (e.g., belief-stationary) can be erratic. To recover some regularity on this
dynamics, many papers consider some irreducibility-type assumption on the transition function
of the POMDP (see e.g. [1, 5, 6]). In this paper, we will not need this type of assumption, and
consider the POMDP model in its full generality.
This paper concerns POMDPs with long duration, where state, action and signal sets are finite.
Considerable work has been devoted to the definition and characterization of the optimal long-
term payoff (see [1]). We emphasize below several results of the literature with regard to this
question, that are intimately related to our paper:
• n-stage problem and discounted problem. A first standard approach is to consider the
n-stage problem, with average expected payoff E( 1
n
∑n
m=1 rm), where rm stands for the
payoff at stage m. The long-term optimal payoff can be defined as the limit of the n-stage
value, as n tends to infinity (asymptotic value). By Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [16], this
limit exists and coincides with the limit of the discounted value, as the discount factor
vanishes.
• Uniform value. Another standard approach is to define the payoff in the infinite problem as
being the long-run average payoff criterion lim infn→+∞ E( 1n
∑n
m=1 rm) (see Arapostathis
et al. [1]), and consider the value of this problem (uniform value). Again, by Rosenberg,
Solan and Vieille [16], this coincides with the asymptotic value.
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• Liminf (average) evaluation. A third approach is to define the payoff in the infinite problem
as being E(lim infn→+∞ 1n
∑n
m=1 rm), as studied in Gillette [14]. The authors [19] have
proved that the value of this problem coincides with the asymptotic value.
• General uniform value. As an extension of the first approach, Renault and Venel [14]
consider problems with weighted payoff: the payoff is E
(∑
m>1 θmrm
)
, where the θm are
positive numbers that sum to 1. They define the impatience of θ as being the total variation
I(θ) =
∑
m>1 |θm+1 − θm|. They proved that the value of the problem where the total
payoff is the inferior limit of E
(∑
m>1 θmrm
)
, as I(θ) tends to 0, is again the asymptotic
value.
The first and second result can be deduced either from the third or from the fourth. Though the
third and fourth result are seemingly independent, the following connection can be made: one
can see the liminf evaluation as a payoff with random weights, where the weights depend on the
history. This observation was the starting point of this paper. Since these four notions of value
coincide in finite POMDPs, we will simply call them the asymptotic value in the following.
Contribution of the paper This paper unifies and generalizes the above results, and aims at
finding the largest possible class of optimal long-term payoffs that coincides with the asymptotic
value. For this purpose, we introduce the problem with history-dependent evaluations. As in
[14], we consider weighted payoffs, but we allow θm to depend on the past observed history of
the problem: that is, the sequence of actions and signals that are generated before stage m− 1
(included). We define the irregularity of an evaluation as being Eσx1
(|θ1|+∑+∞m=1 |θm − θm+1|).
The first main result of this paper is to prove that the value of the problem where the total
payoff is the inferior limit of E
(∑
m>1 θmrm
)
, as the irregularity tends to 0, is equal to the
asymptotic value. This generalizes all the results mentioned previously. Moreover, we provide
several classes of weighted payoffs for which none of the previous results applied. We give several
examples that illustrate the tightness of our assumptions.
In addition, our result has the following significant consequence: the value of the problem
with total payoff E
(
lim supn→+∞
1
n
∑n
m=1 gm
)
is also the asymptotic value, where gm is the
expectation of the stage payoff with respect to the belief at stage m. The main difficulty for
deducing this result is that the limsup depends on the behavior in the long run, hence the
relative weight of the payoff at stage m may depend on the future.
A straightforward consequence is that, when the decision-maker is informed of his payoffs
(POMDP with known payoffs), then the value of the problem with total payoff
E
(
lim supn→+∞
1
n
∑n
m=1 rm
)
is also equal to the asymptotic value. Last, we present an example
that shows that in the absence of the known-payoff assumption, the value of the above problem
may be strictly greater than the asymptotic value.
Section 1 states the model and main definitions, and Section 2 presents our contributions.
Section 3 gives a sketch of the main results’ proofs, and compare them with previous literature
techniques. Sections 4 and 5 prove the two theorems.
1 Model
1.1 POMDPs
Let us start with a few notations. We denote by N∗ the set of strictly positive integers. If A
is a measurable space, we denote by ∆(A) the set of probability measures over A. If a ∈ A,
we denote by δa the Dirac mass at a. If (A, d) is a compact metric space, we will always equip
(A, d) with the Borel σ-algebra, and denote by B(A) the set of Borel subsets of A. The set of
continuous functions from A to [−1, 1] is denoted by C(A, [−1, 1]). The set ∆(A) is compact
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metric for the Kantorovich-Rubinstein distance dKR, which metrizes the weak
∗ topology. Recall
that the distance dKR is defined for all z and z
′ in ∆(A) by
dKR(z, z
′) := sup
f∈E1
∣∣∣∣∫
A
f(x)z(dx) −
∫
A
f(x)z′(dx)
∣∣∣∣ = inf
π∈Π(z,z′)
∫
A×A
d(x, y)π(dx, dy),
where E1 ⊂ C(A, [−1, 1]) is the set of 1-Lipschitz functions from (A, d) to [−1, 1] and Π(z, z′) ⊂
∆(A×A) is the set of measures on A×A with first marginal z and second marginal z′. Because
A is compact, the infimum is a minimum. When A is finite and d is the discrete metric, then
dKR is the L
1-norm on ∆(A). For f ∈ C(A, [−1, 1]), the linear extension of f is the function
fˆ ∈ C(∆(A), [−1, 1]), defined for z ∈ ∆(A) by
fˆ(z) :=
∫
A
f(x)z(dx).
A (finite) Partially Observable Markov Decision Process Γ = (K, I, S, q, r) is defined by the
following elements:
• K is a finite state space,
• I is a finite action space,
• S is a finite signal space,
• q : K×I → ∆(K×S) is the transition function that associates to each pair (state, action)
a distribution over states and signals,
• r : K × I → [0, 1] is the payoff function.
Throughout the paper, we use the notation X := ∆(K). This article only considers POMDPs
defined by finite sets, and therefore the finiteness assumption will not be stated anymore.
Given x1 ∈ X, the POMDP starting from x1, denoted by Γ(x1), proceeds in the following way:
• Before the game starts, an initial state k1 is drawn according to the distribution x1. The
decision-maker knows x1 but not k1.
• At each stage m > 1, the decision-maker chooses im ∈ I, and receives a payoff r(km, im).
A pair (km+1, sm) is drawn according to q(km, im). The next state is km+1, and the
decision-maker is informed of sm.
The sequence (k1, i1, s1, . . . , km, im, sm, . . . ) is called a play. The set of plays is denoted by
H∞ = (K × I × S)N. For every n > 1, we define the set of histories of length n by Hn =
(K × I × S)n−1 ×K and the set of histories by Hf = ∪n>1Hn.
We denote by Ho∞ = (I × S)N the set of observed plays. For every n > 1, we define the
set of observed histories at stage n by Hon = (I × S)n−1 and the set of observed histories by
Hof = ∪n>1Hon.
Definition 1. A behavior strategy σ of the decision-maker is a function from Hof to ∆(I). It
is said to be pure if for every h ∈ Hof , σ(h) is a Dirac mass at some action i ∈ I. The set of
pure strategies is denoted by Σp.
Definition 2. A pure strategy σ is said to have finite memory if it can be modeled by a finite-
state transducer. Formally, such a strategy is described as σ = (σu, σa,M,m0), where M is a
finite set of memory states, m0 is the initial memory state, σa : M → I is the action selection
function and σu : M × I × S →M is the memory update function.
3
1.2 History-dependent evaluation
Throughout the paper, we identify a history hm and the subset of plays that have prefix hm.
This subset of plays is called a finite cylinder. We denote by F the σ-field on H∞ generated
by finite cylinders. An initial probability x1 ∈ X and a behavior strategy σ naturally induce a
probability measure on the set of finite cylinders, that extends in a unique way to H∞, by the
Kolmogorov extension theorem. This probability measure is denoted by Pσx1 and the expectation
under P is denoted by Eσx1 .
Similarly, an observed play and an observed history can be seen as subsets of plays. We
denote by Fom the σ-field on H∞ generated by observed histories of length m and by Fo the
σ-field generated by observed histories.
Definition 3. An evaluation is a sequence of functions θ = (θm)m>1 from H∞ to [0, 1]. It is
said to be
• history-dependent if for every m > 1, θm is measurable with respect to Fom.
• normalized if for every h∞ ∈ H∞,
+∞∑
m=1
θm(h∞) = 1.
• normalized in expectation at (x1, σ) if Eσx1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θm(h∞)
)
= 1.
We denote by Θ the set of evaluations and by ΘN the set of history-dependent normalized
evaluations.
Let us compare our definition with literature. Two standard evaluations are the n-stage
evaluations and the λ-discounted evaluations. They correspond to the case where for all m > 1,
θm is deterministic, and θm =
1
n
1m6n for the former, and θm = λ(1 − λ)m−1 for the latter.
Renault and Venel [14] consider more general evaluations, but that are still deterministic.
Neyman and Sorin [12] consider n-stage evaluations, in which n is a random variable. This
is not a particular case of our model, since the latter features evaluations which are determinis-
tic functions of the past observed history, while the random variable n in the former follows a
history-independent process.
Let x1 ∈ X and θ ∈ Θ. The problem starting from x1 and with evaluation θ, denoted by
Γθ(x1), has payoff function:
∀σ ∈ Σ, γθ(x1, σ) := Eσx1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θmr(km, im)
)
.
The value vθ(x1) of this problem is the maximum expected payoff with respect to behavior
strategies:
vθ(x1) := sup
σ∈Σ
γθ(x1, σ) = sup
σ∈Σp
γθ(x1, σ). (1)
The fact that the supremum can be taken over pure strategies is a consequence of Feinberg [10,
Theorem 5.2]. For every ε > 0, a strategy σ is said to be ε-optimal in Γθ(x1) if
γθ(x1, σ) > vθ(x1)− ε.
In particular, when θm =
1
n
1m6n is the deterministic n-stage evaluation (n > 1), the correspond-
ing value is denoted by vn(x1). Moreover, the following result is known:
Proposition 1 (Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [16]). Let Γ be a POMDP and x1 ∈ X an initial
distribution. The sequence (vn(x1))n>1 converges to some limit v
∗(x1), called the asymptotic
value.
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2 Contributions
2.1 Weighted value
The first definition generalizes the impatience introduced in Renault and Venel [14] to history-
dependent evaluations.
Definition 4. For every evaluation θ, every x1 ∈ X and every strategy σ, we define I(θ, x1, σ)
in [0,+∞] by
I(θ, x1, σ) = E
σ
x1
(
|θ1|+
+∞∑
m=1
|θm − θm+1|
)
,
and the irregularity by
I(θ, x1) = sup
σ∈Σ
I(θ, x1, σ).
The following definition adapts the classical notion of uniform value to history-dependent
normalized evaluations.
Definition 5. Let x1 ∈ X. The POMDP Γ(x1) has a weighted value v∞(x1) ∈ [0, 1] if
• for all ε > 0, there exists α > 0 such that for all θ ∈ ΘN ,
I(θ, x1) 6 α implies that vθ(x1) 6 v∞(x1) + ε.
• for all ε > 0, there exists α > 0 and σ∗ ∈ Σ such that:
∀ θ ∈ ΘN (I(θ, x1) < α) implies that γθ(x1, σ∗) > v∞(x1)− ε. (2)
A strategy that satisfies the above condition is called an ε-weighted-optimal strategy.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be a POMDP. For every x1 ∈ X, Γ(x1) has a weighted value equal to the
asymptotic value v∗(x1). Moreover, for every ε > 0, the decision-maker has an ε-weighted-
optimal pure strategy with a finite memory.
Let us emphasize several classes of evaluations that are covered by this result. First, we
recover two results that were already known.
• λ-discounted evaluations and n-stage evaluations: when restricted to these evaluations, the
weighted value definition coincides with the notion of uniform value. Existence of uniform
value has been proven by Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [16] (see also [13] and [19]).
• Deterministic evaluations: the weighted value coincides with the notion of general uniform
value, which existence has been proven in [14].
Moreover, we can study new classes of evaluations:
• Decreasing evaluations: this corresponds to the case where (θm) is almost surely decreasing,
and θ1 vanishes. Note that the usual “trick” to express decreasing evaluations as a convex
combination of average payoffs would not work here, due to the fact that the weights
depend on the history.
• N -piecewise constant evaluations: this corresponds to the case where there exists some con-
stant N such that almost surely, (θm) takes at most N different values, and supm>1 E(θm)
vanishes.
We now give two examples that show that the measurability assumption of θm with respect
to F0m is essential.
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Proposition 2. There exists a POMDP Γ, an initial belief distribution x1 and a sequence of
evaluations (θl) such that for all l > 1 and m > 1, θlm is measurable with respect to Fm (but not
to F0m), the impatience of (θl) vanishes, and
v∗(x1) < lim
l→+∞
vθl(x1).
Proof. We consider the following example with two states K = {α, β}, two actions I = {α, β}
and one signal S = {s0}. The payoff is 1 if state and action match, and 0 otherwise. Moreover,
the state never changes.
Let x1 :=
1
2 · δα + 12 · δβ . For any θ ∈ ΘN , any strategy in Γθ(x1) gives payoff 1/2, thus
vθ(x1) = 1/2.
Now consider the following evaluation θl (l > 1) which depends only on the state variable at the
initial stage:
• if k1 = α then the weight is concentrated on the first l stages: for every 1 6 m 6 l,
θlm(α, ...) =
1
l
and for every m > l + 1, θlm(α, ...) = 0.
• if k1 = β then the weight is concentrated between stage l + 1 and stage 2l: for every
l + 1 6 m 6 2l, θlm =
1
l
and for every m 6 l or m > 2l + 1, θlm = 0.
Consider the strategy that plays action α during l stages and then β forever. This strategy
yields the maximal payoff 1 in Γθl(x1), hence vθl(x1) = 1. Since I(θ
l
m, x1) = 2/l, the result
follows.
Proposition 3. There exists a POMDP Γ, an initial belief distribution x1 and a sequence of
evaluations (θlm) such that for all l > 1 and m > 1, θ
l
mis measurable with respect to F0 (but not
with respect to F0m), the impatience of (θl) vanishes, and
v∗(x1) < lim
l→+∞
vθl(x1).
Proof. Consider the Markov chain on K = {α, β}, where at each stage, the state is drawn
uniformly. The payoff is 1 in state α, and the payoff is 0 in state β. Let x1 :=
1
2 · δα + 12 · δβ .
Thus, v∞(x1) = 1/2. Consider the evaluation θlm such that: θlm = 1/l for N + 1 6 m 6 N + l,
where N is the first stage such that the state is α in all stages between N + 1 and N + l, and
θlm = 0 otherwise. We have vθ(x1) = 1 and I(θ
l
m, x1) = 2/l, and thus the result is proved.
2.2 Limsup evaluations
In addition to the above classes, it turns out that the proof of Theorem 1 allows us to deal with
another type of evaluations, namely the lim sup (average) evaluations. These are not history-
dependent evaluations in the sense of Definition 3, but they can be approximated by them in
some sense. We turn to this point now.
In a previous paper [19], we focused on the lim inf evaluation, where informally the decision-
maker is pessimistic about the length of the game. Given an initial belief x1 ∈ X, the POMDP
with lim inf evaluation Γ∞(x1) is the problem with strategy set Σ, and payoff function γ∞
defined for all σ ∈ Σ by
γ
∞
(x1, σ) := E
σ
x1
(
lim inf
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
r(km, im)
)
.
This type of payoff was introduced by Gillette for stochastic games [11]. The value of Γ∞(x1),
called the lim inf value, is
v∞(x1) := sup
σ∈Σ
γ
∞
(x1, σ) = sup
σ∈Σp
γ
∞
(x1, σ). (3)
The supremum can be taken over pure strategies as a direct consequence of Theorem 5.2 in
Feinberg [10]. This value coincides with the asymptotic value v∗(x1) [19], and for all ε > 0,
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there exists an ε-optimal pure strategy with finite memory [7].
Let us now analyze the opposite situation where the decision-maker is optimistic about the
length of the game. This leads to consider the lim sup-evaluation, where the payoff is defined by
γ∞(x1, σ) = E
σ
x1
(
lim sup
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
r(km, im)
)
.
The associated value is denoted by v∞(x1), and called the lim sup value. Unfortunately, this
evaluation is not a function of the observed history, which makes it outside of the scope of
Theorem 1. By properties of finite Markov chains, if the decision-maker restricts himself to finite-
memory strategies, then the lim inf evaluation and the lim sup evaluation coincide but it may
not be the case if the strategy does not have finite memory. Though for the lim inf evaluation,
infinite-memory strategies does not yield a higher payoff than finite-memory strategies, this is
not the case for the lim sup evaluation, as shown by the following example.
Proposition 4. There exists a POMDP Γ and an initial belief distribution x1 such that
v∞(x1) < v∞(x1).
Proof. We consider the following example with two states K = {α, β}, two actions I = {T,B}
and only one signal S = {s0} (blind MDP). The payoff is 0 in state α and 1 in state β. Moreover,
we assume that the transition is given as follows: when the decision-maker plays T , the state
stays the same, and when he plays B, the state switches to the other state.
Let us consider the initial distribution (1/2, 1/2), then this problem admits a weighted value
equal to 1/2, that is guaranteed by any strategy.
On the contrary, the lim sup value is equal to 1. The following strategy guarantees 1 for the
lim sup evaluation: play T for 2 stages, play B once, play T for 22
2
stages, play B once, play T
for 2n
2
stages, play B, and so on and so forth.
Starting from state α (resp. β), the sequence of states is uniquely determined and payoffs
alternate between long blocks of 0 and long blocks of 1. Since the block sizes get larger and
larger, one can check that the payoff under the lim sup evaluation is equal to 1 on each of the
two infinite histories. Hence, the limsup value is equal to 1. Notice that the strategy has infinite
memory and that its payoff under the lim inf evaluation is equal to 0.
There is another way to define such an optimistic evaluation that will lead to a positive
result, namely the lim sup-belief evaluation. Given an observed play ho∞, we can define xm as
the belief of the decision-maker at stage m, conditionally on the observed play:
xm =
{
P
σ
x1
(km = . |hom ) if Pσx1(h0m) > 0,
δk0 otherwise,
where k0 is a fixed arbitrary state. It is a function of h
o
m, the observed history until stage m,
and of the initial belief x1. Moreover, since the decision-maker remembers his actions, this is
independent of the strategy used. The lim sup-belief evaluation is then defined by
γ∞(x1, σ) := E
σ
x1
(
lim sup
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
g(xm, im)
)
,
where g(p, i) =
∑
k∈K p(k)g(k, i), for all p ∈ ∆(K) and i ∈ I. Given an initial belief x1 ∈ X, the
POMDP with lim sup-belief evaluation Γ∞(x1) is the problem with strategy set Σ, and payoff
function γ∞. Its value, called the lim sup-belief value, is denoted by v∞(x1).
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a finite POMDP. For every x1 ∈ X, the lim sup-belief value v∞(x1) and
the weighted value v∞(x1) = v∗(x1) coincide.
It is interesting to notice the asymmetry between the lim sup-belief evaluation and the lim inf
evaluation. For the sake of the discussion, let us introduce the lim inf-belief evaluation defined
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by
γ∞(x1, σ) = E
σ
x1
(
lim inf
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
g(xm, im)
)
.
Its value is denoted by v∞(x1), and called the lim inf-belief value. By definition of the inferior
and superior limit and Fatou’s Lemma, we clearly have
γ
∞
(x1, σ) 6 γ∞(x1, σ) 6 γ∞(x1, σ) 6 γ∞(x1, σ),
and the same inequalities hold for the corresponding values:
v∞(x1) 6 v∞(x1) 6 v∞(x1) 6 v∞(x1),
To summarize, we have obtained the following results. The authors [19] showed that v∞(x1) is
equal to v∗(x1). Proposition 4 shows that v∞(x1) may be strictly greater than v∗(x1). Finally,
in Theorem 2, we prove that v∞(x1) is also equal to v∗(x1).
Nonetheless, under the natural assumption that the decision-maker observes his payoffs,
Theorem 2 implies that the lim sup value coincides with the asymptotic value:
Definition 6. A POMDP has known payoffs if the set of states K can be partitioned in a way
such that for all states k, k′, k1, k2 in K, actions i, i′ in I, and signal s in S:
• if k1 ∼ k2 then r(k1, i) = r(k2, i) (two states in the same element of the partition induce
the same payoff function),
• if q(k, i)(k1, s) > 0 and q(k′, i′)(k2, s) > 0 then k1 ∼ k2 (observing the public signal is
enough to deduce the element of the partition containing the current state).
Corollary 1. Assume that the POMDP Γ has known payoffs. Then
v∞(x1) = v∞(x1).
Proof. Consider the auxiliary POMDP Γ′ = (K ′, I, S, q′, r′), such that K ′ = K × g(K × I), and
r′(k, u) = u. The transition on (first component, signal) is the same as in Γ, and the second
component of the state at stage m+1 corresponds to the stage payoff at stage m in Γ. Formally,
for every (k, u) ∈ K ′ and every (i, s) ∈ I × S,
q′((k, u), i) =
∑
(l,s)∈K×S
q(k, i)(l, s)δ(k,r(k,i)),s.
Naturally, the sets of observed histories in both games are equal and therefore the sets of
strategies are the same. One can check easily that, for each strategy, the lim sup payoff in both
games are equal, hence their lim sup values coincide. Moreover, the lim sup-belief evaluation and
the lim sup evaluation coincide in Γ′. Applying Theorem 2 to Γ′, we obtain the result.
3 Sketch of proof and comparison with literature
In the remainder of the paper, we will assume that the payoff r is only a function of the state
variable. Indeed, as explained in the proof of Corollary 1, given a POMDP Γ, one can build an
auxiliary POMDP where the new state space is a finite subset of K × [0, 1], and the payoff only
depends on the state, and is shifted one stage onward. Existence of lim sup value is equivalent
in both POMDPs, and the same is true for the weighted value.
3.1 Theorem 1
Our proof borrows several ingredients from the three papers [19, 14, 7]. In the sketch of proof
below, we emphasize the differences and common points with these works. To prove Theorem 1,
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we need to prove first that the decision-maker can guarantee v∗(x1), for any θ such that I(θ, x1)
is small enough (lower bound), and that he can not do better (upper bound).
Lower bound Let us prove that the decision-maker can guarantee v∗(x1) in Γθ(x1), for any θ
such that I(θ, x1) is close to 0. We rely on the existence of ε-optimal strategies with finite memory
for the lim inf-evaluation, proved in [7]. A crucial point is that under a finite memory strategy
σ, the process (state,memory state, action, signal) is a finite Markov chain. This enables to
express both the lim inf evaluation payoff and the history-dependent evaluation payoff in terms
of the ergodic structure of the Markov chain, from which the result follows. Establishing the first
expression is straightforward, while the second one is more involved. First, using the definition
of impatience, we prove that it is enough to consider a restricted class of θ, that are constant by
blocks. We can then relate the history-dependent payoff to a combination of terms of the form:
E
σ
x1
1
l
(t+1)l∑
m=tl+1
rm
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ftl+1
 ,
where l is a fixed (large) integer, and t is large. Using the underlying Markov chain structure
again, we can bound from below the history-dependent payoff in terms of the ergodic structure
of the Markov chain.
Upper bound In a second part, we consider θl such that I(θl, x1) tends to 0, and prove that
lim supl→+∞ vθl 6 v∞(x1). A sequence of actions and a sequence of signals induce a sequence of
beliefs of the decision-maker over the state variable. Such a sequence of beliefs (x1, ..., xt, ...) to-
gether with a sequence of weights (θ1, ..., θt, ...) can be aggregated into a probability distribution
over beliefs such that, informally, for every t > 1, xt has measure θt. An initial belief x1 and a
strategy σ generate a probability distribution on plays, hence a distribution over distributions
over beliefs, by the previous construction. By considering the barycenter of this distribution over
distributions over beliefs, we obtain a probability distribution over beliefs µ(x1, σ, θ
l), called the
occupation measure. We consider an accumulation point µ∗ of (µ(x1, σ, θl)), and prove that it
is an invariant measure. Intuitively, an invariant measure can be interpreted as follows: there
exists σ∗ : ∆(K) → ∆(I) such that when the initial belief p is drawn according to µ∗, and
the decision-maker plays action σ∗(p), then the belief at stage 2 is distributed according to µ∗.
For deterministic evaluations, the fact that the accumulation point is an invariant measure was
proved in [14], and is rather straightforward. In our random framework, the proof is much more
intricate, and we need to dedicate a whole section to it.
The end of the proof builds on three inequalities. First, by definition of µ(x1, σ, θ
l) and some
regularity properties, we have
lim sup
l→+∞
vθl(x1) =
∫
∆(K)
g(x)µ∗(dx).
Moreover, we have ∫
∆(K)
g(x)µ∗(dx) 6
∫
∆(K)
v∗(x)µ∗(dx).
This inequality was already used in [14]. Last, we have∫
∆(K)
v∗(x)µ∗(dx) 6 v∗(x1).
The above inequality is more challenging. In the deterministic case, this corresponds to the
classical decreasing property of values along play trajectories, that follows from a standard
dynamic programming principle argument. In the random case, one has to use a martingale
argument and the optional sampling theorem. Combining the three inequalities yields the desired
result.
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3.2 Theorem 2
A lim sup-belief evaluation is not a weighted evaluation but it is possible to approximate the
lim sup-belief evaluation by a weighted evaluation that depends on the observed play: for every
observed play, consider N such that 1
N
∑N
m=1 r(xm) is close to lim supn→+∞
1
n
∑n
m=1 r(xm) and
define the weights to be equal to 1/N · 1m6N .
The first difficulty is that N is not measurable with respect to the past history, in general.
Thus, this yields an evaluation θ such that θm is not measurable with respect to F0m. As
enlightened by Proposition 3, this assumption is crucial for Theorem 1 to hold. The trick is
to consider an ε-optimal strategy σ∗ for the lim inf evaluation, and to define the conditional
distribution
ρlm = E
x1
σ∗
(
θlm|Fom
)
.
This restores the measurability assumption but introduces a second difficulty: this evaluation is
not normalized at (x1, σ
∗), but only normalized in expectation. This property is not enough to
apply Theorem 1 directly. Fortunately, part of its proof can still be used. Indeed, the proof of
the upper bound of Theorem 1 only requires θ to be normalized in expectation (the normalized
assumption is required for the lower bound). Thus, if one proves that the impatience of ρl tends
to 0, then we deduce directly that
v∞(x1) 6 v∗(x1) = v∞(x1).
The converse inequality being trivial, this implies the result. Finally, we show that the impa-
tience of ρl tends to 0. This requires precise martingale inequalities and is the main difficulty
of the proof.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
This section is decomposed into four steps. First, we introduce several notations that will be
used in the remainder of the section. In particular, we reformulate the payoff as a function of
the beliefs and introduce the notion of invariant measure that is the key element of our proof.
Second, relying on the existence of a finite-memory strategy that is ε-optimal for the lim inf
evaluation [7], we prove that the decision-maker can guarantee v∗(x1) − ε in a uniform sense
in the POMDP. In order to do so, we will use that v∗(x1) = v∞(x1). In the third section,
assuming that some measure µ∗ is an invariant measure of the POMDP, we prove that v∗(x1) is
the maximal payoff that the decision-maker can guarantee. The fourth section is dedicated to
the proof that the measure µ∗ is indeed an invariant measure.
Recall that in the rest of the paper, the payoff function is assumed to be action-independent,
and this is without loss of generality.
4.1 Preliminaries
Given an evaluation θ ∈ Θ, x1 ∈ ∆(K) and σ, we can reformulate the payoff in terms of the
belief of the decision-maker. Recall that given an observed play ho∞, xm is defined as the belief
of the decision-maker at stage m conditional to the observed history until the current stage. We
will forget the dependence to x1 which will be fixed and therefore, we obtain for every m > 1
that xm is a function from H
o∞ to ∆(X). Denote by g the linear extension1 of r to X:
∀ x ∈ X, g(x) =
∑
k∈K
x(k)r(k).
1We choose not to use the notation rˆ since r will not play any role in the rest of the paper.
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The function g is Lipschitz on X, hence continuous, and
E
σ
x1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θmr(km)
)
= Eσx1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θmg(xm)
)
. (4)
Let A and B be two compact metric spaces, equipped with their Borelian σ-field. We now
define the notion of projected image. Let ψ : A → B be a measurable function and ν ∈ ∆(A),
then we recall that the image µ of ν by ψ is the unique probability measure such that for every
measurable mapping f : B → [−1, 1],∫
b∈B
f(b)µ(db) =
∫
a∈A
f(ψ(a))ν(da).
In our proofs, we will need a slightly different result that combines the image of a measure
and the barycenter. First, we need the following definition (see [8, Chapter 11, section 1.8]):
Definition 7. Let ν ∈ ∆(∆(B)). The barycenter of ν is the unique probability measure µ =
Bar(ν) ∈ ∆(B) such that for all f ∈ C(B, [−1, 1]),
fˆ(µ) =
∫
∆(B)
fˆ(z)ν(dz).
We can compose the two previous notions to obtain the following one.
Definition 8. Let ϕ : A→ ∆(B) measurable and ν ∈ ∆(A), then we define the projected image
µ of ν by ϕ as the barycenter of the image of ν by ϕ. This is the unique measure on B such that
for every measurable mapping f : B → [−1, 1],∫
b∈B
f(b)µ(db) =
∫
a∈A
(∫
b∈B
f(b)ϕ(a)(db)
)
ν(da).
The characterization is straightforward by combining the characterization of the image of a
measure and the characterization of the barycenter.
A measurable mapping σ : X → ∆(I) can be interpreted as a stationary strategy, that is, a
strategy that plays after every history according to the current belief only. We now define the
notion of image of a measure over ∆(X) by a stationary strategy and the notion of invariant
measure. Recall that X = ∆(K).
Definition 9. Let µ ∈ ∆(X) be a probability distribution over beliefs and σ : X → ∆(I) be a
stationary strategy, we define ν the image of µ by the strategy σ as follows:
• define σ♯q : X → ∆(X) by
σ♯q(x) =
∑
(k,i,s)∈K×I×S
x(k)σ(x)(i)q(k, i)(s) · δq(x,i,s),
where q(k, i)(s) =
∑
k′∈K q(k, i)(k
′, s), q(x, i, s) = (q(x, i, s)(k))k∈K with q(x, i, s)(k) =
q(x,i)(k,s)∑
k′∈K q(x,i)(k
′,s) and q(x, i)(k, s) =
∑
k′∈K x(k
′)q(k′, i)(k, s),
• define ν as being the projected image of µ by σ♯q.
Definition 10. A measure µ ∈ ∆(X) is an invariant measure of Γ if there exists σ a stationary
strategy such that the image of µ by the strategy σ is µ.
4.2 The decision-maker guarantees at least v∗(x1)
In this section, we will show that for any normalized history-dependent evaluation θ, the decision-
maker guarantees the value v∗(x1) up to an error term that vanishes when the irregularity tends
to 0. To this aim, it is enough to prove the following proposition:
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Proposition 5. Let Γ be a POMDP and x1 ∈ X. For every ε > 0, there exists a strategy σ and
l > 1 such that for every history-dependent normalized evaluation θ ∈ ΘN ,
E
σ
x1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θmr(km)
)
> v∗(x1)− 4lI(θ, x1, σ)− ε. (5)
The key point of the proof is the existence of a pure strategy with finite memory that is ε-
optimal in the problem with lim inf evaluation, proved in [7]. As highlighted before, the lim inf
value v∞(x1) has been shown to be equal to v
∗(x1). We establish the following result for Markov
chains:
Lemma 1. Consider a finite Markov chain χ on a state space U and y1 ∈ ∆(U). For all
ǫ > 0, there exists l > 1 such that for any normalized history-dependent evaluation θ defined on
H ′∞ = (U)N and function f defined from U to [0, 1], we have
E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θmf(um)
)
> E
χ
y1
(
lim inf
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
f(um)
)
− 4lI(θ, y1, χ)− ε. (6)
Proposition 5 stems from Lemma 1. Indeed, consider ε > 0. Denote by σ = (σu, σa,M,m0)
a pure strategy with finite memory that is (ε/2)-optimal at x1 for the problem with lim inf
evaluation. The transition q together with σ induces a finite Markov chain on K ×M × I × S
with transition function χ defined by:
χ(k,m, i, s) =
∑
k′∈K,s′∈S
q(k, i′)(k′, s′) · δk′,σu(m,i′,s′),i′,s′ where i′ = σa(m).
Moreover, we have by construction that the probability Pσx1 on infinite histories induced by σ in
the POMDP is equal to the marginal on H∞ of the probability on (K ×M × I ×S)N generated
by the Markov chain χ. Applying Lemma 1 for ε/2 implies Proposition 5.
The rest of this section is dedicated to the proof of Lemma 1. The state space U being
finite, we know that the set of states can be decomposed into ergodic classes {U1, ..., UD} and a
transient class U0. Given Ud an ergodic class, there exists nd > 1 and γd ∈ [−1, 1] such that
∀u ∈ Ud, ∀n > nd, Eχu
(
1
n
n∑
m=1
f(um)
)
> γd − ε, (7)
and on the event {u1 ∈ Ud},
1
n
n∑
m=1
f(um) converges almost surely to γd. (8)
Moreover, there exists n0 > 1 such that
∀u ∈ U, ∀n > n0, Pχu(un ∈ U0) 6 ε. (9)
Let l = maxd∈{0,...,D} nd. The idea will be to decompose the payoff as a convex combination of
evaluations that are constant on blocks of size l. Let y1 ∈ ∆(U).
We start by expressing the value for the lim inf evaluation in terms of (γd)d∈{1,...,D}. We know
that
E
χ
y1
(
lim inf
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
f(um)
)
= Eχy1
(
lim inf
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=l+1
f(um)
)
,
= Eχy1
(
E
χ
y1
(
lim inf
n→+∞
1
n− l
n∑
m=l+1
f(um)
∣∣∣∣∣ul+1
))
.
By Equation (9), we know that the probability that ul+1 is in U0 is smaller than ε. By
Equation (8), we know that, conditionally on ul+1 to be in Ud, the payoff almost-surely converges
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to γd, hence we obtain
E
χ
y1
(
lim inf
n→+∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
f(um)
)
6
D∑
d=1
γdP
χ
y1
(ul+1 ∈ Ud) + ε. (10)
Consider now θ = (θm)m>1 a history-dependent evaluation. We are going to establish the
following lower bound, that is similar to the upper bound of Equation (10):
E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θmf(um)
)
>
D∑
d=1
(γd − ε)Pχy1(ul+1 ∈ Ud)− 4lI(θ, y1, χ). (11)
Combining Equations (10) and (11) implies Lemma 1. The rest of the section is dedicated to
the proof of Equation (11). Let us define a new evaluation ω = (ωm)m>1, which is a piecewise-
constant approximation of (θm)m>1, in the following way: ωm = θtl+1, where t is the unique
integer such that tl + 1 6 m 6 (t+ 1)l.
First, we can bound the difference of the payoff under evaluation θ from stage 1 and the payoff
under evaluation ω from stage l + 1 by a function depending on the irregularity.
Lemma 2. For every function b : H ′∞ → [0, 1], we have∣∣∣∣∣Eχy1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θmb(h
′
m)
)
− Eχy1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmb(h
′
m)
)∣∣∣∣∣ 6 2lI(θ, y1, χ).
Proof. We have∣∣∣∣∣Eχy1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θmb(h
′
m)
)
− Eχy1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmb(h
′
m)
)∣∣∣∣∣
6
∣∣∣∣∣Eχy1
(
l∑
m=1
θmb(h
′
m)
)∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣Eχy1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
θmb(h
′
m)
)
− Eχy1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmb(h
′
m)
)∣∣∣∣∣ .
Let us focus on the left-hand term. For every m > 1, we have
E
χ
y1
(|θm|) 6 Eχy1
(
|θ1|+
m−1∑
t=1
|θt+1 − θt|
)
6 I(θ, y1, χ).
Hence, ∣∣∣∣∣Eχy1
(
l∑
m=1
θmb(h
′
m)
)∣∣∣∣∣ 6 Eχy1
(
l∑
m=1
|θm|
)
6 lI(θ, y1, χ).
The right-hand term is smaller than
E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
|θm − ωm|
)
=
+∞∑
t=1
E
χ
y1
 (t+1)l∑
m=tl+1
|θm − θtl+1|
 6 +∞∑
t=1
E
χ
y1
l (t+1)l−1∑
m=tl+1
|θm+1 − θm|
 .
Therefore, the right-hand term is smaller than lI(θ, y1, χ).
Let us now give a lower bound on the payoff under evaluation ω:
Lemma 3. We have
E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmf(um)
)
> E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmf
′(h′m)
)
,
where f ′ is a function from histories to [0, 1] defined as follows:
∀m > 1, ∀h′m ∈ Um, f ′(h′m) =
{
γd − ε if ul+1 ∈ Ud,
0 otherwise .
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Proof. Indeed, we have
E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmf(um)
)
= Eχy1
(
E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmf(um)
∣∣∣∣∣ ul+1
))
. (12)
Let us first focus on what happens on one block. Let t > 0, we have
E
χ
y1
1
l
(t+1)l∑
m=tl+1
f(um)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ftl+1
 = Eχutl+1
(
1
l
l∑
m=1
f(um)
)
, (13)
>
{
γd − ε on the event {utl+1 ∈ Ud} ,
0 otherwise.
(14)
Moreover, when ul+1 ∈ Ud, the state stays forever in Ud almost surely. Thus, one can replace
{utl+1 ∈ Ud} by {ul+1 ∈ Ud} in the above inequality. Hence, for every d ∈ {1, ...,D} and every
t > 1, we have
E
χ
y1
 (t+1)l∑
m=tl+1
ωmf(um)
1ul+1∈Ud
 > Eχy1
ωtl+1l
1
l
(t+1)l∑
m=tl+1
f(um)
1ul+1∈Ud
 ,
> E
χ
y1
(
ωtl+1l(γd − ε)1ul+1∈Ud
)
,
> E
χ
y1
 (t+1)l∑
m=tl+1
ωm(γd − ε)1ul+1∈Ud
 .
We can now express the payoff under evaluation ω:
E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmf(um)
)
=
D∑
d=0
+∞∑
t=1
E
χ
y1
 (t+1)l∑
m=tl+1
ωmf(um)
1ul+1∈Ud
 ,
>
D∑
d=1
+∞∑
t=1
E
χ
y1
 (t+1)l∑
m=tl+1
ωm(γd − ε)1ul+1∈Ud
 ,
> E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmf
′(h′m)
)
.
Then, we deduce from Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 a lower bound for the payoff evaluated under
the evaluation (θm)m>1: we have
E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θmf(um)
)
> E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmf(um)
)
− 2lI(θ, y1, χ), (15)
> E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=l+1
ωmf
′(h′m)
)
− 2lI(θ, y1, χ), (16)
> E
χ
y1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θmf
′(h′m)
)
− 4lI(θ, y1, χ), (17)
=
D∑
d=1
(γd − ε)Py1χ (ul+1 ∈ Ud)− 4lI(θ, y1, χ). (18)
This concludes the proof of Lemma 1.
14
4.3 The decision-maker guarantees at most v∗(x1)
We now prove that the decision-maker can not guarantee more than v∗(x1).
Proposition 6. Let Γ be a POMDP and (θl)l>1 be a sequence of normalized evaluation such
that (I(θl, x1))l>1 converges to 0. For every x1 ∈ X, we have
lim sup
l→+∞
vθl(x1) 6 v
∗(x1).
If we could a priori restrict to strategies with finite memory, we would just adapt the argu-
ment of the previous section. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and thus we have to proceed
differently. In order to prove Proposition 6, we establish the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let Γ be a POMDP, x1 ∈ X, (σl)l>1 a sequence of strategies and (θl)l>1 a sequence
of evaluations such that θl is normalized in expectation at (x1, σ
l), and (I(θl, x1))l>1 converges
to 0. Then
lim sup
l→+∞
γθl(x1, σ
l) 6 v∗(x1).
Proposition 6 is an immediate consequence of Lemma 4. Indeed, for every l > 1, consider σl
a strategy 1
l
-optimal in the game Γθl(x1). Since θ
l is a normalized evaluation, it is in particular
normalized in expectation at (x1, σ
l). Therefore, one can apply Lemma 4 and obtain Proposition
6. Proposition 1 and Proposition 6 together then yield Theorem 1.
The remainder of the section is dedicated to the proof of Lemma 4. Its proof is decomposed
in two steps. In this subsection, admitting that some measure µ∗ is an invariant measure for
the POMDP, we prove that v∞(x1) = v
∗(x1) is the maximal payoff that the decision-maker can
guarantee. The next subsection is dedicated to the proof that µ∗ is indeed an invariant measure
(Lemma 5).
Fix Γ, x1 ∈ X, (σl)l>1 a sequence of strategies and (θl)l>1 a sequence of evaluations such
that θl is normalized in expectation at (x1, σ
l), and (I(θl, x1))l>1 converges to 0. First, one can
extract a subsequence of (σl)l>1 and (θ
l)l>1 such that the payoff along the subsequence converges
to lim sup γθl(x1, σ
l). For convenience, we still denote these sequences by (σl)l>1 and (θ
l)l>1.
Denote by πl the measure Pσ
l
x1
on H∞.
Let µl ∈ ∆(X) be the barycenter of the law of ∑+∞m=1 θlmδxm , where xm is the belief of the
decision-maker at stage m along the observed history. Formally, let ϕ be the mapping from H∞
to ∆(X) defined by
ϕ(h∞) =
+∞∑
m=1
θlm(h∞)δxm(h∞).
Define µl as the projected image of πl by ϕ: for any measurable function f on X,∫
x∈X
f(x)µl(dx) =
∫
H∞
(∫
X
f(x)ϕ(h∞)(dx)
)
πl(dh∞),
=
∫
H∞
(
+∞∑
m=1
θlm(h∞)f(xm)
)
πl(dh∞).
Since (θlm)m>1 is normalized in expectation at (x1, σ
l), µl ∈ ∆(X).
The state space ∆(X) being compact for the weak* topology, we can consider µ∗ an accu-
mulation point of the sequence (µl)l>1. The following lemma is crucial, and its proof is done in
the next subsection.
Lemma 5. µ∗ is an invariant measure.
Let σ such that µ∗ is invariant under σ. As proved by the authors [19], Birkhoff’s theorem
implies that under σ and starting from µ∗, the average payoff converges almost surely to a
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random variable with expectation v̂∗(µ∗). Hence, we have gˆ(µ∗) 6 v̂∗(µ∗), and
γθl(x1, σ
l) = Eσ
l
x1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θlmr(km)
)
= Eσ
l
x1
(
+∞∑
m=1
θlmg(xm)
)
= gˆ(µl). (19)
The function g being 1-Lipschitz on (X, ‖.‖1), we deduce that gˆ is 1-Lipschitz on (∆(X), dKR),
hence continuous. Thus, by taking the limit when l goes to infinity, we obtain that
lim sup
l→+∞
γθl(x1, σ
l) = gˆ(µ∗).
We have Eσ
l
x1
(v∗(xn+1)|Fn) 6 v∗(xn). Moreover, since the payoff is bounded, v∗ is bounded.
We will reformulate the payoff by introducing a randomized stopping-time in order to apply Doob
optional stopping theorem. An interpretation of the payoff γθl(x1, σ
l) can be the following: at
every stage, there is a randomized variable that decides whether the process stops or continues;
if the process stops, then the payoff is the current stage payoff whereas if the process continues,
the payoff is 0.
Define the extended space Ω = H∞ × [0, 1]N and ξl the extension of πl by i.i.d. uniform
random variable on [0, 1]. We then define the stopping time τ on Ω by
τl(h∞, x1, ..., xn) = t when for every s < t, xs >
θls
1−∑s−1u=1 θlu and xt 6 θ
l
t
1−∑t−1u=1 θlu .
By definition of µl, πl and ξl, we have
v̂∗(µl) =
∫
X
v∗(x)µl(dx) =
∫
H∞
(
+∞∑
m=1
θlmv
∗(xm)
)
πl(dh∞) =
∫
Ω
v∗(xτl)ξl(dω).
The process (v∗(xn)) is a super-martingale on the extended space Ω, and is bounded. Thus, the
optional stopping theorem yields ∫
Ω
v∗(xτl)ξl(dω) 6 v
∗(x1).
Thus, setting l to infinity, v̂∗(µ∗) 6 v∗(x1). Hence,
lim sup
l→+∞
γθl(x1, σ
l) = gˆ(µ∗) 6 v̂∗(µ∗) 6 v∗(x1). (20)
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.
4.4 Proof of Lemma 5
The aim of this section is to prove that the measure µ∗ defined in the previous section is
an invariant measure. The proof is decomposed as follows. For every l > 1, we construct
θlf ∈ ∆(Hof ), θ′lf ∈ ∆(Hof ) and µl, µ′l ∈ ∆(X) such that
(i)
‖θ′lf − θlf‖1 :=
∑
h∈Ho
f
|θ′lf (h)− θlf (h)| 6 2I(θl, x1),
(ii)
dKR(µ
′l, µl) 6 ‖θ′lf − θlf‖1,
(iii) (µl)l>1 converges to µ
∗,
(iv) There exists a strategy σl∗ such that µ′l is the image of µl by σl∗.
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We can then combine these results to obtain the proof of Lemma 5. Indeed, by (iii), (µl)l>1
converges to µ∗. Since I(θl, x1) converges to 0, (i) and (ii) imply that (µ′l)l>1 also converges to
µ∗ when l goes to infinity. The next step is to extend (iv) to the limit and show the existence
of a strategy σ∗ such that µ∗ is the image of µ∗ by σ∗. In order to obtain this result, we apply
Proposition 20 and Proposition 32 in [19]. Hence, we obtain that µ∗ is an invariant measure.
4.4.1 Definition of θlf and θ
′l
f
We first define θlf . We consider the mapping ψ from H∞ to ∆(H
o
f ) such that
ψ(h∞) =
+∞∑
m=1
θlm(h∞)δhom ,
where hom is the truncation of h∞ up to stage m restricted to actions and signals. Define θlf to
be the projected image of πl by ψ.
Informally, θ′lf is defined in order to fit the following story: an observed history h is chosen
randomly following θlf , and told to the decision-maker. He then plays σ
l(h), yielding a new
observed history of length |h| + 1. Formally, let ξ be the mapping from the set of observed
histories to X that associates to an observed history hn the belief of the last stage xn. Denote
by θ′lf the distribution such that
∀(h, i, s) ∈ Hof × I × S, θ′lf (h, i, s) = θlf (h)q(ξ(h), i)(s)σl(h)(i).
We now prove that the distance between θlf and θ
′l
f is controlled by the irregularity.
Lemma 6. We have
‖θlf − θ′lf‖1 6 2I(θl, x1).
Proof. For the proof, it will be convenient to decompose histories according to their length. For
every m > 1, denote by πlm the image of π
l by the projection on the histories of length m. Let
m > 1, h′m ∈ Hom and (i, s) ∈ I × S, then we have
θlf ((h
′
m, i, s)) =
∫
h∞∈H∞
(
θlm+1(h∞)1h∞|m+1=(h′m,i,s)
)
πl(dh∞),
= πlm+1((h
′
m, i, s))θ
l
m+1((h
′
m, i, s)),
since θlm+1 is Fom+1-measurable. Moreover, we have
θ′lf ((h
′
m, i, s)) = θ
l
f (h
′
m)q(ξ(h
′
m), i)(s)σ
l(h′m)(i),
= πlm(h
′
m)θ
l
m(h
′
m)q(ξ(h
′
m), i)(s)σ
l(h′m)(i),
= πlm+1((h
′
m, i, s))θ
l
m(h
′
m),
since
πlm+1((h
′
m, i, s)) = π
l
m(h
′
m)σ
l(h′m)(i)q(ξ(h
′
m), i)(s).
It follows that ∑
(h′m,i,s)∈Hom×I×S
|θ′lf ((h′m, i, s))− θlf ((h′m, i, s))|
=
∑
(h′m,i,s)∈Hom×I×S
πlm+1((h
′
m, i, s))|θlm(h′m)− θlm+1((h′m, i, s))|,
=
∫
h∞∈H∞
|θlm(h∞)− θlm+1(h∞)|πl(dh∞).
The result follows by summation over m.
4.4.2 Link with µl and definition of µ′l
We define µ′l to be the image of θ′lf by ξ. Moreover, we have the following results.
Lemma 7.
• µl is the image of θlf by ξ,
• dKR(µl, µ′l) 6 ‖θlf − θ′lf‖1.
Proof. θlf and µ
l: By definition, θlf satisfies that for every measurable function f : H
0
f → R, we
have ∫
Ho
f
f(h)θlf (dh) =
∫
H∞
(
+∞∑
m=1
θlm(h∞)f(hm)
)
πl(dh∞).
Denote by ν the image of θlf by ξ, then for every f : X → R measurable, we have∫
X
f(x)ν(dx) =
∫
Ho
f
f(ξ(h))θlf (dh) =
∫
H∞
(
+∞∑
m=1
θlm(h∞)f(xm)
)
πl(dh∞).
Hence, ν is the projected image of πl by ϕ and, by uniqueness, ν is equal to µl.
dKR(µ
l, µ′l) 6 ‖θlf − θ′lf‖1: The L1 norm can be seen as the Kantorovitch-Rubinstein metric
associated to the discrete distance d on Hf . Hence, if f is 1-Lipschitz from X with L
1-norm to
[−1, 1], then the mapping f ◦ ξ is 1-Lipschitz for d since
|f(ξ(h)) − f(ξ(h′))| 6 ‖ξ(h)− ξ(h′)‖1 6 d(h, h′).
It follows that∫
x∈X
f(x)µl(dx)−
∫
x∈X
f(x)µ′l(dx) =
∫
h∈Ho
f
f(ξ(h))θlf (dh)−
∫
h∈Ho
f
f(ξ(h))θ′lf (dh),
6 ‖θlf − θ′lf‖1.
Since it is true for any 1-Lipschitz function f , we obtain dKR(µ
l, µ′l) 6 ‖θlf − θ′lf‖1.
4.4.3 Definition of the strategy σ∗
We now construct the strategy σl∗ that maps µl to µ′l. Consider the distribution θlf , we can
define the extended measure denoted θlf over H
o
f ×X by associating to an observed history h,
its end-belief ξ(h). We can then consider the disintegration with respect to the last coordinate.
There exists a kernel K : X × B(Hof )→ [0, 1] such that for all f : H0f ×X → R measurable,∫
(h,x)∈Ho
f
×X
f(h, x)θlf (dh, dx) =
∫
x∈X
(∫
h∈Ho
f
f(h, x)K(x, dh)
)
µl(dx).
Informally, the kernel K(y, dh) associates to the belief y a distribution over finite observed
histories that have y as end-belief. We now consider for every y ∈ X, σl∗(y) to be the projected
image of K(y, .) by the mapping σl : Hof → ∆(I) that associates to any finite history the
distribution over the actions played.
Lemma 8. The image of µl by σl∗ is µ′l.
Proof. Recall that µ′l is the image of θ′lf by ξ: hence, it is the unique measure such that for
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every measurable function on X,∫
x∈X
f(x)µ′l(dx) =
∫
(h,i,s)∈Ho
f
×I×S
f(ξ(h, i, s)))θ′lf (d(h, i, s)),
=
∑
(i,s)∈I×S
(∫
h∈Ho
f
f(ξ(h, i, s))q(ξ(h), i)(s)σl(h)(i)θlf (dh)
)
.
Define ν as the image of µl by the strategy σl∗ and check that it satisfies the characterization of
µ′l. Let f : X → R measurable. By definition of the image of µl by the strategy σl∗,∫
y∈X
f(y)ν(dy) =
∫
x∈X
(∫
y∈X
f(y)(σl∗)
♯q(x)(dy)
)
µl(dx),
=
∫
x∈X
 ∑
(k′,i,s)∈K×I×S
f(q(x, i, s))σl∗(x)(i)q(k
′, i)(s)x(k′)
µl(dx),
=
∑
(i,s)∈I×S
(∫
x∈X
f(q(x, i, s))σl∗(x)(i)q(x, i)(s)µ
l(dx)
)
.
It follows by definition of σl∗ as the projected image of K(x, dh) by σl that∫
y∈X
f(y)ν(dy) =
∑
(i,s)∈I×S
(∫
x∈X
(∫
h∈Ho
f
f(q(x, i, s))σl(h)(i)q(x, i)(s)K(x, dh)
)
µl(dx)
)
,
=
∑
(i,s)∈I×S
(∫
(h,x)∈Ho
f
×X
f(q(x, i, s))σl(h)(i)q(x, i)(s)θlf (dh, dx)
)
,
=
∑
(i,s)∈I×S
(∫
h∈Ho
f
f(q(ξ(h), i, s))σl(h)(i)q(ξ(h), i)(s)θlf (dh)
)
.
By Bayes rule, we have q(ξ(h), i, s) = ξ(h, i, s). It implies that∫
y∈X
f(y)ν(dy) =
∑
(i,s)∈I×S
(∫
h∈Ho
f
f(ξ(h, i, s))q(ξ(h), i)(s)σl(h)(i)θlf (dh)
)
.
We recognize the characterization of µ′l, and the lemma is proved.
5 Proof of Theorem 2
In this section, we establish the proof of Theorem 2. First, we replace Proposition 1 by a direct
comparison between the lim inf payoff and the lim sup-belief payoff. Second, we introduce an
appropriate sequence of evaluations and apply Lemma 4 to prove the other inequality.
5.1 A history-dependent evaluation that approximates the lim sup-evaluation
Fix x1 ∈ X. As we have already seen, it is straightforward that v∞(x1) 6 v∞(x1). Let us prove
the reverse inequality. Let ε > 0 and σ be an ε-optimal strategy in Γ∞(x1). We denote by π
the probability distribution generated by x1 and σ on (K× I×S)∞, previously denoted by Pσx1 .
Let l > 1. We define the integer random variable ηl:
ηl := inf
{
n′ > l | 1
n′
n′∑
m=1
r(xm) > lim sup
N→+∞
1
N
N∑
m=1
r(xm)− 1
l
}
. (21)
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By construction, ηl is Fo-measurable. Define the sequence of functions (θlm)m>1 such that for
every h∞ ∈ H∞ and for every m > 1,
θlm(h∞) :=
1
ηl(h∞)
1m6ηl(h∞).
Notice that the evaluation (θlm)m>1 is not history-dependent. Nevertheless, one can define ρ
l
m =
E
σ
x1
(
θlm|Fom
)
. By construction, (ρlm)m>1 is history-dependent and normalized in expectation at
(x1, σ) and we have
v∞(x1) 6 Eσx1
(
lim sup
N→+∞
1
N
+∞∑
m=1
r(xm)
)
+ ε 6 γθl(x1, σ) + ε+
1
l
= γρl(x1, σ) + ε+
1
l
.
Moreover, we can control the irregularity of the sequence (ρl)l>1.
Proposition 7. The sequence (I(ρl, x1))l>1 goes to 0 when l goes to infinity.
Assume that this proposition holds. By Lemma 4, we have lim supl→+∞ γρl(x1, σ) 6 v∞(x1).
Thus, v∞(x1) 6 v∞(x1)+ε, and since ε is arbitrary, v∞(x1) 6 v∞(x1), and Theorem 2 is proved.
5.2 Control of the irregularity: Proof of Proposition 7
In order to finish the proof of Theorem 2, we show that the irregularity of ρl goes to 0 when l
goes to infinity. It relies on the fact that the sequence (ρlm)m>1 is a super-martingale such that
for every m > 1,
|ρlm| 6 min
(
1
l
,
1
m
)
. (22)
Let n > 1. By definition of ρln, one has
E
σ
x1
(
ρln+1 |Fn
)
= Eσx1
(
E
σ
x1
(
1
ηl
1n+16ηl |Fn+1
)
|Fn
)
,
= Eσx1
(
1
ηl
1n6ηl |Fn
)
− Eσx1
(
1
ηl
1n=ηl |Fn
)
,
= ρln −
1
n
E
σ
x1
(
1n=ηl |Fn
)
.
since {n 6 ηl} = {n < ηl} ∪ {n = ηl} = {n + 1 6 ηl} ∪ {n = ηl}.The previous computation
implies the following equality for the square difference: for every stage n > 1,
E
σ
x1
((
ρln+1 − ρln
)2)
= Eσx1
(
(ρln+1)
2
)
− 2Eσx1
(
ρlnE
σ
x1
(
ρln+1 |Fn
))
+ Eσx1
(
(ρln)
2
)
,
= Eσx1
(
(ρln+1)
2
)
− 2Eσx1
(
(ρln)
2 − ρ
l
n
n
E
σ
x1
(
1n=ηl |Fn
))
+ Eσx1
(
(ρln)
2
)
,
= Eσx1
(
(ρln+1)
2 − (ρln)2
)
+ 2Eσx1
(
ρln
n
1n=ηl
)
.
Proposition 8. I(θl, x1) converges to 0 when l goes to infinity.
Proof. We first recall a classical result on martingales, obtained by using Cauchy-Schwartz
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inequality:
E
σ
x1
(
n∑
t=m
|ρlt+1 − ρlt|
)
6
√√√√Eσx1
(
n∑
t=m
(ρlt+1 − ρlt)2
)
Eσx1
(
n∑
t=m
1
)
, (23)
6
√
n−m+ 1
√√√√Eσx1 ((ρln+1)2 − (ρlm)2)+ 2 n∑
t=m
Eσx1
(
ρlt
t
1t=ηl
)
, (24)
6
√
n−m+ 1
√
Eσx1
(
1
m2
+
1
m2
+ 2
1
m2
)
, (25)
6 2
√
n−m+ 1
m
. (26)
where the second inequality is deduced from the previous computation and a telescopic summa-
tion. The third inequality stems from the fact that, by assumption, |θlt| is bounded from above
on {m, . . . , n} by 1
m
(Equation (22)). Since |θlt| is also bounded from above by 1l , Equation (22)
and similar computations yield
E
σ
x1
(
n∑
t=m
|ρlt+1 − ρlt|
)
6 2
√
n−m+ 1
l
. (27)
We now split the set of integers into a sequence of blocks Bk such that Bk has length k and
then apply on each block the previous equations. The sequence of blocks is defined as follows:
B1 =
{
ρl1
}
,and for every k > 2, Bk = {tk−1 + 1, . . . , tk}, where tk = k(k + 1)/2.
On each Bk, we apply inequality (26) and obtain
E
σ
x1
 tk∑
t=tk−1+1
|ρlt+1 − ρlt|
 6 2√k
(tk−1 + 1)
=
4
√
k
k(k − 1) + 2 .
Let ak =
4
√
k
k(k−1)+2 , k > 1. The serie (ak)k>1 is converging, hence I(θ
l, σ, x1) is finite and moreover
for every m > 1,
E
σ
x1
(
+∞∑
t=m
|ρlt+1 − ρlt|
)
6
+∞∑
t=ϕ(m)
at,
for some ϕ(m) such that ϕ(m) is increasing to +∞. Using that |θlt| is bounded by above over
the interval 1 to l − 1 by 1
l
, we deduce that
I(θl, x1, σ) 6 E
σ
x1
(
ρl1 +
l−1∑
t=1
|ρlt+1 − ρlt|+
+∞∑
t=l
|ρlt+1 − ρlt|
)
,
6
1
l
+
2
√
l − 1
l
+
+∞∑
t=ϕ(l)
at,
where we apply inequality (27) to the block {1, . . . , l − 1} and inequality (26) to the other blocks.
The three terms converge to 0 as l goes to infinity, and Proposition 8 is proved.
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